
Security Implications of the Session Identifier

(draft-tschofenig-nsis-sid-00.txt)

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Background

- **Discussions** about the session ownership problems already started with the requirements work
- We spend some time at the New York **interim meeting** to discuss some issues.
- I promised to **capture** the **current status** of our discussions and to make them available to other working group members (to get a bigger audience).

Problem

- We discussed the problems several times already.
- However, no real progress seen so far.
- Mobility (in combination with security) is still somewhat fuzzy.

Goal

- Point to
 - the **implications** to the signaling protocol with regard to certain solutions
 - the **problems** with the presented problem and the corresponding solutions
 - the relationship to mobility
- As part of the mobility related NSIS signaling the following question must be addressed: **What is the expected functionality?**

Draft Content

- Several **proposals**, which have been **discussed** in the past, are described:
- These proposals are categorized into
 - *Global* (applicable to all nodes along the path)
 - *Local* (applicable to particular domains only e.g. visited network)
- Details can be obtained from the draft (and will not be discussed here).
- **Important part:**
 - Solutions give the reader information about the assumptions and the consequences

Pending Issues

- Which is the authorizing entity?
- Which action might be authorized by whom?
- Is the Session Identifier concept useful? (tradeoff benefit vs. additional overhead)
- How should mobility signaling work in detail (e.g. always end-to-end signaling messages assumed)?
- How should replay protection be handled?