#### **HIP Location Privacy Framework**

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#### Overview

- Motivation
- Host Identity Protocol
- Location Privacy Architecture
- IPv6 Instantiation
- Conclusions



#### Motivation

- □ Location privacy is a growing requirement
  - Users don't wish to be tracked
- Current Internet architecture does not provide location privacy
  - A topological location can give an accurate geographical position
- Why Host Identity Protocol (HIP) as base for a location privacy framework?
  - HIP decouples identifier and locator
  - Separate layers provide more "space" for a location privacy solution



## Host Identity Protocol (HIP)

#### □ 3.5 Protocol


- Shim between Network and Transport Layers
- New cryptographic Namespace
  - Public/Private Key pairs
- Uses Host Identity Tags
  - Hash of 128 bits (same size as an IPV6)
  - No changes required in the applications
- Supports Mobility
  - Locator agility



### Host Identity Protocol (II)

#### Base Exchange (BE)

- Cryptographic four-way handshake
- Exchanges Identities (Public Keys)
- Establishes bidirectional Security Associations
- Bound end to end tunnels



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


## Location Privacy

- "... location privacy is the capability of preventing other parties from learning one's past or current location ..."
- Current HIP architecture does not take into account location privacy
- □ HIP is an end to end protocol
  - Initiator/Responder learns the location of each other
- Loss of Location Privacy occurs every time a locator parameter is included in HIP procedures
  - □ Base exchange (R1 and I2 messages)
  - Mobility procedures



#### Location Privacy Architecture



- Rendezvous Agent (RVA)
  - HI to IP resolution
  - assigns globally routable IP addresses (IPg) to attendants
  - readdresses IPg's to HITs and vice-versa
  - handles local mobility
  - **RVA Protected Area** 
    - no IPg are used inside these areas for routing
    - identity based routing (or IPv6)
  - RVA Advertisement System
    - Sustained by the AR
    - Announces the AR and RVA Identifiers



#### Location Privacy Gains

- Location hidden from end-points
  - Protects from willing and unwilling disclosure
- □ HMN Location only revealed to eavesdroppers in the AN
  - Layer 2 problem with a Layer 2 solution
- Limited information revealed
  - Global addresses
  - Size of RVA areas determines the amount of geographical information revealed
  - Impossible to see local mobility
  - Possible to see inter RVA movement
    - But just for core network eavesdroppers




## IPv6 Instantiation

- IPv6 Access network
- Node acquires Local Address
- Responder sees Global Address
- Address Translation at the RVA
- Neighbor Discovery Protocol (ND) as advertisement system



### Prototype Evaluation Scenario



- RVA performs translations for two protected areas
- Node a communicates with node B
- Evaluate Round Trip Time and Bandwidth
- Evaluate leakage of endpoint addresses




## Results (I)

Networks	Node A	Node B
Area 1	3ffe::1	2001::6ada:1e65:93f3:ff00
Core	2001::ded8:ce89:6390:eb00	2001::6ada:1e65:93f3:ff00
Area 2	2001::ded8:ce89:6390:eb00	3ffa::1

- □ Location leakage analysis
  - Node A only sees B's global address
  - Node B only sees A's global address
  - Core network packets only have global addresses
  - Real attachment addresses only "visible" in local network



# Results (II)



Average TCP Bandwidth (Mbps/s)		
Without RVA	With RVA	
6.43	6.44	

- Readdressing performed on all packets
  - Source and destination replacement
- RTT average is only slightly increased
  - Difference of 0.06 ms (on the averages)
  - TCP impact is negligible
    - Difference of 0.01 Mbps (on the averages)
- Translations have minimal impacts



## Conclusions

- □ Framework conceals endpoints location
  - Local information contained in protected areas
  - Transport independent (within protected areas)
  - Architecturally supported
- Retains HIP Mobility support
  - But Local Mobility is hidden from peers
- Minimal performance impact
  - Negligible TCP impact
  - Minimum RTT increase (performance can be improved with the assistance of dedicated hardware)
- Requires both sides to implement the framework



#### Thank you

#### Questions ?

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